On Monday, South Korea conducted two hours of live-fire exercises near its disputed boundary with North Korea in the West Sea, despite Pyongyang’s promises of “merciless retaliatory strikes” and “total war” for infringing waters it considers its own.
The consensus is that these particular threats were “empty,” as the Associated Press termed them, but it’s far too early to say the matter is closed.
Why? Because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North calls itself, apparently—and for good reason—believes that attacking South Korea and killing its citizens advances its national interests.
First, Pyongyang has been trying for years to move its West Sea boundary with South Korea, known as the Northern Limit Line, farther south to give it control of additional islands and waters. The line was unilaterally drawn by the US-led United Nations Command after the Korean War, and Pyongyang has attacked this South Korean territory from time to time in failed attempts to force a border adjustment. In 2010, there were two startling provocations in these same waters: the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March (46 killed) and the November shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (four killed, including two civilians). The area will likely be home to trouble again in the near future.
Second, the North needs food, and the Kim family has traditionally provoked incidents to blackmail the international community into coughing up food aid. The tactic may be murderous, but Western leaders have made it an effective approach by routinely caving to the North’s extortion.
Third, Kim Jong Un may try to use an incident to undercut South Korea’s conservative politicians—who take a harder line against Pyongyang than their “progressive” counterparts—as the country heads into parliamentary elections in April and a presidential election in December. Kim doesn’t get to vote in the South, but it would be foolish to think he wouldn’t use force to influence the outcome of elections there. After all, horrific provocations are a specialty of the Kim family: the two attacks of 2010 look like they had some effect in undermining hard-line President Lee Myung-bak, contributing to the ruling party’s stunning loss of the Seoul mayoralty last October.
Fourth, Kim needs to solidify a somewhat precarious position as heir to his family’s regime, now entering its third generation in power. There are signs of turmoil inside Pyongyang. The commerce minister recently died in a helicopter accident that looks like it was anything but, and the new leader’s half brother, Kim Jong Nam, has, with a series of explosive comments, been evidently trying to destabilize the government from the safety of China. In the North’s twisted logic, unprovoked attacks against the South could well be seen as a way to unify and rally regime elements as well as boost the legitimacy of the latest Kim family dictator.
North Korea can be relied upon to carry through on its threats. It picks the time and the targets well, and it acts for maximum benefit. So just because Pyongyang has not immediately reacted to the most recent South Korean artillery exercise does not mean the matter is forgotten.
The North will strike the South. We just do not know when or where
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