WASHINGTON - North Korea's disastrous bid to launch a Taepodong-2 missile showed Pyongyang has a long way to go before mastering long-range ballistic technology and has failed to draw lessons from previous botched attempts, experts told AFP.
What did North Korea launch?
Pyongyang said it fired a Unha-3 rocket to place a scientific satellite into orbit. The US military said North Korea launched a ballistic intercontinental missile (ICBM), a Taepodong-2, which could be outfitted with a nuclear warhead.
The Taepodong-2, which is about 30 meters long, has three stages with a range of 6,000 to 9,000 kilometers, according to most estimates. North Korea already tested the missile in July 2006 and April 2009, and the regime launched a Taepodong-1 in 1998. All three previous tests ended in failure as well.
What happened?
The missile lifted off at 7:38 am (2238 GMT) from the northwest base of Tongchang-ri and exploded in mid-air at 7:41 am after traveling in a southerly direction, according to the South Korean defense ministry.
The first stage of the rocket separated and fell into the Yellow Sea about 165 kilometers west of Seoul. But the second and third stages failed, US and South Korean officials said.
The missile exploded at an altitude of 70.5 kilometers, with two pieces of the rocket continuing to ascend to 151.4 kilometers before the debris fell into the sea.
What caused the failure?
It is too early to say definitely what caused the unsuccessful launch but "it seems it could have been a problem with the second stage separating and firing," said Peter Crail, an analyst with the Arms Control Association. "The first stage landed somewhere where North Korea had planned."
The result represented a "step backward" for Pyongyang, as the first and second stage had separated successfully in two previous tests, he said.
Managing the separation of stages in a rocket launch is a tough technical challenge that countries with more advanced missile programs still struggle with, said Hans Kristensen, of the Federation of American Scientists.
"If a separation for example happens too late, or not at all, then you can have a second stage igniting -- still being attached to the lower part, and it will blow the thing to pieces," he said.
The timing for each stage has to be exact, and too much vibration could also derail the separation, he said.
What does the failure show about Pyongyang's missile program?
The result suggests the regime's effort is "a bit erratic" and that "they seem to have programmatic problems in terms of learning from their mistakes and successes and then building upon that," Crail said.
In the 2006 test, the second stage was based on a Soviet Nodong missile while in 2009 and in the latest attempt the second stage was modeled after a more modern Russian SSN-6.
The failed test indicates North Korea "has not yet overcome industrial processes such as quality control, reliability analysis, systems integration and technologies like propulsion and altitude control," said Poornima Subramaniam, an analyst at the leading defense journal IHS Jane's.
What is North Korea trying to achieve with its missile project?
A ballistic missile program requires several years of successful tests to be credible, experts said. In 14 years, North Korea staged four tests -- all ending in failure.
"We're still looking at several years off before the North Koreans have a reliable ICBM," said Crail, adding it would take at least another two to three years.
It may be the regime is not looking to build a reliable program, but merely one that poses a potential threat, he said.
"They want to show that they can possibly reach the United States. Simply having a successful test sometime may be good enough to establish what they can call a deterrent," he said.
North Korea was a long way from entering the "league" of states with long-range missiles armed with atomic warheads, Kristensen said. "If North Korea is going to get some form of deliverable nuclear capability, it's not going to happen right away."
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Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts
Monday, April 16, 2012
Thursday, February 23, 2012
Hollow Threats Again from Korea
On Monday, South Korea conducted two hours of live-fire exercises near its disputed boundary with North Korea in the West Sea, despite Pyongyang’s promises of “merciless retaliatory strikes” and “total war” for infringing waters it considers its own.
The consensus is that these particular threats were “empty,” as the Associated Press termed them, but it’s far too early to say the matter is closed.
Why? Because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North calls itself, apparently—and for good reason—believes that attacking South Korea and killing its citizens advances its national interests.
First, Pyongyang has been trying for years to move its West Sea boundary with South Korea, known as the Northern Limit Line, farther south to give it control of additional islands and waters. The line was unilaterally drawn by the US-led United Nations Command after the Korean War, and Pyongyang has attacked this South Korean territory from time to time in failed attempts to force a border adjustment. In 2010, there were two startling provocations in these same waters: the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March (46 killed) and the November shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (four killed, including two civilians). The area will likely be home to trouble again in the near future.
Second, the North needs food, and the Kim family has traditionally provoked incidents to blackmail the international community into coughing up food aid. The tactic may be murderous, but Western leaders have made it an effective approach by routinely caving to the North’s extortion.
Third, Kim Jong Un may try to use an incident to undercut South Korea’s conservative politicians—who take a harder line against Pyongyang than their “progressive” counterparts—as the country heads into parliamentary elections in April and a presidential election in December. Kim doesn’t get to vote in the South, but it would be foolish to think he wouldn’t use force to influence the outcome of elections there. After all, horrific provocations are a specialty of the Kim family: the two attacks of 2010 look like they had some effect in undermining hard-line President Lee Myung-bak, contributing to the ruling party’s stunning loss of the Seoul mayoralty last October.
Fourth, Kim needs to solidify a somewhat precarious position as heir to his family’s regime, now entering its third generation in power. There are signs of turmoil inside Pyongyang. The commerce minister recently died in a helicopter accident that looks like it was anything but, and the new leader’s half brother, Kim Jong Nam, has, with a series of explosive comments, been evidently trying to destabilize the government from the safety of China. In the North’s twisted logic, unprovoked attacks against the South could well be seen as a way to unify and rally regime elements as well as boost the legitimacy of the latest Kim family dictator.
North Korea can be relied upon to carry through on its threats. It picks the time and the targets well, and it acts for maximum benefit. So just because Pyongyang has not immediately reacted to the most recent South Korean artillery exercise does not mean the matter is forgotten.
The North will strike the South. We just do not know when or where
The consensus is that these particular threats were “empty,” as the Associated Press termed them, but it’s far too early to say the matter is closed.
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PrintWhy? Because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North calls itself, apparently—and for good reason—believes that attacking South Korea and killing its citizens advances its national interests.
First, Pyongyang has been trying for years to move its West Sea boundary with South Korea, known as the Northern Limit Line, farther south to give it control of additional islands and waters. The line was unilaterally drawn by the US-led United Nations Command after the Korean War, and Pyongyang has attacked this South Korean territory from time to time in failed attempts to force a border adjustment. In 2010, there were two startling provocations in these same waters: the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan in March (46 killed) and the November shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (four killed, including two civilians). The area will likely be home to trouble again in the near future.
Second, the North needs food, and the Kim family has traditionally provoked incidents to blackmail the international community into coughing up food aid. The tactic may be murderous, but Western leaders have made it an effective approach by routinely caving to the North’s extortion.
Third, Kim Jong Un may try to use an incident to undercut South Korea’s conservative politicians—who take a harder line against Pyongyang than their “progressive” counterparts—as the country heads into parliamentary elections in April and a presidential election in December. Kim doesn’t get to vote in the South, but it would be foolish to think he wouldn’t use force to influence the outcome of elections there. After all, horrific provocations are a specialty of the Kim family: the two attacks of 2010 look like they had some effect in undermining hard-line President Lee Myung-bak, contributing to the ruling party’s stunning loss of the Seoul mayoralty last October.
Fourth, Kim needs to solidify a somewhat precarious position as heir to his family’s regime, now entering its third generation in power. There are signs of turmoil inside Pyongyang. The commerce minister recently died in a helicopter accident that looks like it was anything but, and the new leader’s half brother, Kim Jong Nam, has, with a series of explosive comments, been evidently trying to destabilize the government from the safety of China. In the North’s twisted logic, unprovoked attacks against the South could well be seen as a way to unify and rally regime elements as well as boost the legitimacy of the latest Kim family dictator.
North Korea can be relied upon to carry through on its threats. It picks the time and the targets well, and it acts for maximum benefit. So just because Pyongyang has not immediately reacted to the most recent South Korean artillery exercise does not mean the matter is forgotten.
The North will strike the South. We just do not know when or where
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